ABSTRACT

The purpose of this article is to critically examine the repositioning of public administration in the context of the assumption of President Zuma in his first and second term of office which commenced on May 2009 and 2014 respectively. Firstly, the analysis considers the two ministries established in the Office of the Presidency, namely, the National Planning Commission and Performance Monitoring and Evaluation that came into effect in 2009 and subsequently consolidated into one ministry following the May 2014 elections. Secondly, the article examines the reforms introduced at the national executive that resulted into the formation of new ministries and re-organisation of the cabinet clusters after the May 2014 elections. The data collection methods used for the purpose of this article primarily include document review of existing official documents and annual reports plus a literature review. Institutional blockages that currently hinder effective public service delivery in the Public Service and plausible solutions are also discussed in the article.

INTRODUCTION

This article primarily examines the administrative reforms instituted since 2009 following the assumption of the Zuma administration until 2014, when he commenced his second term. The thrust of the article is that the repositioning of the public service has to a greater extent, albeit with some impediments, is driven by the need to build an efficient, effective and responsive public administration in line with some of the basic values and principles enshrined in Chapter 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
There is a renewed determination and impetus to ensure effective alignment and coordination of planning across all spheres of government, national, provincial and local and more importantly the examination of the efficacy of the implementation of government policies, programmes and projects through continuous performance monitoring and evaluation. Suffice it to say that the establishment of the Performance Monitoring and Evaluation ministry is akin to the Canadian Office of the Controller (OCG) that was introduced in the 1980s mandated specifically to carry out evaluation research and the Government-wide Operational Performance Measurement System (OPMS) coordinated by the federal Treasury Board (Howlett & Ramesh 2003:212). Governments across the world have institutionalised monitoring and evaluation systems for a variety of reasons (Cloete 2006). Equally, the defining feature of some of the East Asian developmental states such as Japan and South Korea is that they were able to craft long term policies through the setting up of institutional structures and planning systems geared towards driving growth and development policies, programmes and projects in line with the economic development imperatives of their respective governments.

Edigheji (2009:60) asserts that there is no one formula for constructing a developmental state. The South African developmental state is based upon the adaptation of some elements of the Asian developmental states especially with respect to the central development planning that produced the National Development Plan in 2012. It should be borne in mind that in every historical epoch developmental states have been constructed to respond to specific contextual developmental challenges.

Mkandawire (2001:56) contends that the term developmental state does not only apply to those that have attained economic growth, but also includes states that attempt to deploy both administrative and political resources to the tasks of economic development, yet are not able to grow as a result of external factors such as bad luck and miscalculation. He denounces the comparison of states in Africa with developed ones as well as the sense of despondency that this comparison has brought. In the African context, any state that develops an appropriate institutional structure in order to spark growth merits recognition as a developmental state. African states should determine what works for them, informed by their circumstances rather than emulate the East Asian models unchanged.

According to Turok (2010:499), a developmental state exhibits three important features. Firstly, they are capable of planning and making long-term strategic decisions beyond pragmatic responses to political pressures and problems as they emerge. Secondly, they have the analytical capacity to separate the causes of problems from their symptoms and their consequences. Thirdly, they have organisational capacity to focus on the underlying issues for more tangible outcomes. The primary objective of the developmental state tends to be employment creation. Such states should also be capable of early action in anticipation of difficulties and of minimising the risks of problems occurring or reaching unmanageable proportions. A priority in countries like South Africa is to shift the economic development path in a more inclusive and dynamic direction. It is insufficient to expand the output of the existing structure and reproduce its deficiencies, or to enrich a narrow section of the previously disadvantaged population through administrative and legal mechanisms.

In the case of the South African developmental state, the perennial problems facing the society such as the high levels of unemployment, poverty and inequalities on the one hand...
and the growing economic power gap among and between the various racial groups on the other hand, and more importantly the stagnant economic growth levels experienced since the 2008 global economic recession have necessitated an interventionist political and economic driven approach aimed at cushioning the negative effects of the global financial and economic crises impacting on the domestic economy. It was also necessary to intervene in the running of the economy in favour of emancipating the majority of the poor, unemployed and economically marginalised sectors of the population from the pervasive socio-economic situation.

The weaknesses related to the functionality of government were revealed by the Presidential Review Commission appointed by the former President, Nelson Mandela in 1997, which amongst others noted: Lack of effective monitoring and evaluation mechanisms: “Present institutional arrangements within government further lack monitoring and evaluation systems to measure performance and evaluate policy outcomes. Annual Reports, which national and provincial departments prepare, are largely poor, skeletal and not always helpful. These largely fail objectively to outline successes and failures of the previous year. They are also not flexibly enough to give immediate feedback to policy makers and implementers” (Presidential Review Commission Report, 27 February 1998 [online]).

Cloete (2009:294) reflects on the state of monitoring and evaluation in the South African Public Service by thus, expressing that until recently, no coherent system of systematic monitoring and evaluation existed in the South African Public Service. This state of affairs, however, changed in 2005. The Presidency is currently coordinating the implementation of a massive implementation programme known as the Government-wide Monitoring and Evaluation System (GWM&ES). This programme is intended to establish a uniform system of performance monitoring and evaluation throughout all the spheres of government.

However, the most serious weakness of the current emerging GWM&ES framework is that it does not contain any suggestion of the focus or contents of what needs to be monitored and evaluated. The framework currently focuses on how monitoring and evaluation activities in government and in other agencies could be structured (Cloete 2009:303). This gap would certainly be addressed in the envisaged Green Paper (which would culminate into a White Paper) on Performance Monitoring and Evaluation which was released before end of 2009 by the Minister responsible for Monitoring and Evaluation in the Office of the Presidency (Chabane 2009 Budget Vote for the Office of the Presidency).

At the same time, each line function department currently has its own strategic vision and action plans, but they are in many cases in conflict with one another, and there has not been any attempt to synchronise these individual plans in a single coherent national vision (e.g. the short-term focus of AsgiSA vs. the long term focus of the National Spatial Development Framework (Cloete 2009:303). At times it is glaringly apparent that most departments both in the national and provincial spheres are operating in silos, narrow focused and inward manner. Thus, the establishment of the National Planning Commission heralded a new dispensation in the drive to ensure that a coherent and sound national vision coupled with integrated planning is shaped and driven throughout all spheres of government. The diagnostic report that was published by the National Planning Commission headed by the former Minister, Trevor Manuel, in 2011 was a first attempt to generate a broader understanding of the underlying causes and symptoms of the problems facing the South African developmental state. This report allowed the broader civil society, labour, business,
government institutions and members of the public to engage and deliberate on the plausible solutions that eventually informed the development of the National Development Plan which is now in the public domain. This plan has now found a meaning and prioritisation in the State of the Nation Address delivered by President Jacob Zuma (Zuma Inauguration Speech May 2014) and the recent Budget Speech by former Minister Pravin Gordhan on February 2014 (Gordhan Budget Speech February 2014).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK UNDER-PINNING ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

Administrative reforms are influenced by array of considerations. Some of these include internal and the external environments. Reforms often aim to balance the needs of the time, the pressures from the environment, and the intention and capability of the system (Caiden 1991). Reforms are implemented with the stated objective of enhancing the capacity of the government and the bureaucracy by simplifying procedures, restructuring the organisation, rearranging personnel, or streamlining the administrative functions, of which a number of them appear to have a common objective of cost-cutting (Huque 2002:8). Political considerations play a crucial role in the process. In the absence of strong political authority in a country, the bureaucracy may be able to assume a strong position and set the agenda for the reform process. In most cases, administrative reforms are aimed at serving the interest of the government in cutting costs, improving services, and enhancing the acceptability of its programmes to the electorate (Huque 2007:587).

The foregoing view is also expressed by Carstens and Thornhill by asserting that reform actions are normally introduced through the direct involvement of politicians whose actions are aimed at improving the operations of government and public administration to attain national goals. Reform could be applied comprehensively spanning the entire public sector, or selectively (Carstens & Thornhill 2000:178). Reform refers to intended or designed changes into established or routine ways of life, of the ways organisations perform, of governance, administration, and management. Reform may be profound and fundamental alteration of the existing order, or it may simply be a surgical alteration in the system of organisation and administration, government, and politics (Farazmand 2007:354).

A reform with fundamental changes may ultimately invoke radical changes with significant transformation of a system, and as such can produce revolutionary alteration of the existing order considered no longer desirable or acceptable. Outcomes of radical and revolutionary changes are often unpredictable and they produce uncertainties, at least in the short-run. Examples of this sort include changes in the entire system of government and administration after the Iranian revolution of 1979, the Cuban revolution of 1959 and the Russian revolution of 1917 (Farazmand 1989). The 1994 democratic breakthrough in South Africa can also be conceived of as another example of revolutionary changes albeit with democratic dimensions that yielded radical transformation of system of governance and administration, and politics.

Less revolutionary reforms may also be expected when a system malfunctions, is in disorder, or stagnates. Such reforms could either
● serve and maintain the system by injecting new ideas and revitalising it or
● cause severe disruption, implosion and uncontrollable events that may lead the system to the edge of chaos and breakdown. An example of this kind is Gorbachev’s *perestroika* of the 1980s that caused the collapse of the Soviet Union in the USSR (Farazmand 2007:355).

According to Farazmand (2007:355) reform could be structural, process, and value or cultural oriented. Structural changes are prone to produce fundamental and radical changes, whilst process and value changes may or may not be profound changes with long lasting assumptions. In either case, reforms can serve as powerful forces of change and are important tools of governance, administrative, and managerial systems in both theory and practice.

The other important element of administrative reform relates to reorganisation. Farazmand (2007:356) defines reorganisation as structural rearrangement, reconfiguration, reordering and reformation. It further entails the rescuing of an otherwise disorganised and chaotic system, government, organisational structures and administration. It is a way of bringing in a new structure, a new organisation, a new order. Therefore, to reorganise means to restructure, hence, structural rearrangement and reorganisation. Examples include consolidation of several organisations or agencies into a single structural organisation with a combined or a new name or title. This practice is common in some regional structures usually after a new political leadership assumes political power and office.

**ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN THE CONTEXT OF SOUTH AFRICA**

The public service inherited by the democratic South African government in 1994 was designed to promote and defend the social and economic system of apartheid and was geared to serving the material needs and interests of the minority. Structured along mechanical, closed models of public and development administration, the principal features of the apartheid bureaucracy included rigid racial and ethnic segregation, a serious lack of representivity; fragmentation and duplication; corruption and mismanagement of resources; poor and outdated management practices; a regulatory bureaucratic culture; lack of accountability and transparency; poorly paid and demotivated staff; and conflictual labour relations. It is not surprising, therefore, that a broad consensus emerged in the post-1994 dispensation on the need for a much more efficient, effective and equitable public service, capable of improving the quantity and quality of service provision and redressing the imbalances of the past.

A first step in this direction was taken with the introduction of the *Public Service Act*, Proclamation 103 of 1994, which created the basis for integrating the fragmented system of state administrations inherited from the apartheid era into a unified public service that would operate in both national and provincial spheres. At the same time the government’s *White Paper on Reconstruction and Development* (Office of the President 1994) identified institutional transformation and reform as one of its main programmes for driving the implementation of the RDP (White Paper on Transforming Public Service 1995:14).

Therefore, the establishment of the Performance Monitoring and Evaluation ministry by President Jacob Zuma is an indication of the fact that the current government is intensifying,
in a strong tone, the process that was launched by his predecessors since 1994. For instance, on May 1999, at the outset of the second term of the African National Congress (ANC) government, President Mbeki intensified the reforms that were launched during the time of President Mandela’s government. This demonstrates a certain degree of continuation of government activities in South Africa.

Nevertheless, Bardill (2000:104–105) stresses that where the Mandela presidency was characterised by national reconciliation and political transformation, the emphasis of the Mbeki government was firmly on public service delivery and economic growth. The dedicated implementation of the Batho Pele (People First) programme, in particular, is indicative of this trend. What is perhaps significant in that respect is the fact that the new government’s public service reform programme includes a gamut of New Right managerial measures, including a move towards downsizing, the outsourcing of work, and the introduction of performance management systems and the assignment of greater autonomy to government departments.

The best-seller Reinventing Government (Osborne and Gaebler 1992) probably best summarises the tenets of the move toward a new set of management premises. It lays out a framework for changing the way government does business by positing that government bureaucracies should be freed from many of the constraints placed on them and allowed to focus on results instead of bureaucratically following rules. Its philosophy for management in the public sector has been pioneered through different degrees of success in a number of other countries, such as England, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. In the United States of America, it is partially captured by the total quality management (TQM) movement. Kamensky (1993:396) states that the common thread is the need to be able to manage for results. That means measuring performance. Although it sounds relatively straightforward, it is difficult to implement, because it implies a major reorientation of how managers perform their functions in the public sector. The key is to get decision makers and managers to shift from managing by input controls to managing for performance and results. This shift means managers will have to rely more on quasi-market forces, with a focus on customers, and less on conforming to standard processes and procedures. This shift also means that the biggest challenge is not the creation of measures but getting them implemented.

**POLICY FRAMEWORK**

Beyond the Public Service Act, 1994 and the White Paper on Transforming Public Service, 1995 that promote change within the South African’s public service, it is essential to note the concept of a Senior Management Service (SMS) was initiated by the former Minister for Public Service and Administration, G J Fraser-Moleketi, to promote strategic change in the public service. The policy framework for the SMS is, for instance, aligned to the mandate for the Human Resource Development (HRD) strategy. The strategic thrusts of the Public Service HRD strategy are as follows: capacity building initiatives; organisational support systems initiatives; governance and institutional development initiatives; and economic growth and development initiatives (DPSA SMS 2008:6). All the enabling frameworks for transforming the public service both economically and socially which are focus areas of Government’s agenda form the basis for development and service improvement as a coordinated public service response to human capital development.
In the twenty years of democracy, the government has achieved a number of acknowledgeable results in meeting governance imperatives but the reality also shows that more still needs to be done as some communities are afflicted by scourges of poverty and under-development. Having the needs of communities in mind and striving for rural development, the current government led by President Zuma has taken government efforts to another level through the establishment of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation ministry (including the National Planning Commission) in the Office of the Presidency. At this level, a question is, how will these new structures allow government departments to manage for results? This places an urgent call for the repositioning of the public service which will not happen without some institutional challenges being addressed. Therefore, one needs to examine some of the most pressing issues that is an impediment to the effective performance of the public service.

REORGANISATION OF THE GOVERNMENT THROUGH CLUSTERING

Clustering is concerned with the grouping together of departments with similar, related or shared objectives, or departments that are physically proximate to each other, to ensure a closer cooperation and coordination with the purpose of achieving an integrated system of governance. The clustering of government departments in South Africa is necessitated by the intergovernmental relations framework underpinned by the principle of cooperative governance as prescribed in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The main objective is to ensure proper coordination of all government programmes in the national and provincial spheres of government. Government clusters in South Africa in the national sphere have been created on the basis of a variety of key factors that determines a country’s advantage in terms of national development, namely:

- infrastructure development;
- economic sectors and employment;
- governance and administration;
- justice, crime prevention and security;
- human development;
- international cooperation, trade and security; and
- social protection and community development.

Government clusters focus their endeavours and resources jointly on matters that concern the enhancement of the welfare of the citizens. They cooperate and collaborate with each other for mutual benefit. These involve combination, interchange and sharing of skills and resources to achieve efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of public services. The departments that constitute the Security Cluster work collaboratively to maintain security in the international events this country has hosted before, namely, the inauguration of the African Union (AU), the World Summit on Sustainable Development, the Cricket World Cup of 2003, the FIFA World Cup of 2010, and the hosting of the BRICS Summit (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). Domestically the Security Cluster recently channelled its efforts to ensure a peaceful election and voting process across the country. Following the
appointment of the new ministers by President Zuma, the focus has now shifted to the crucial role that the newly reconfigured Economic Cluster should play in as far as the revitalisation of the economy (which is currently facing a major decline since the recession period in 2008), job creation and reduction of inequalities are concerned. This Cluster is therefore, faced with the challenge of ensuring the integration of economic initiatives and strategies and proper coordination aimed at propelling the economy towards a higher gear and in line with the achievement of the targets set out in the National Development Plan, that is, the creation of 11 million new jobs by 2030 and achievement of economic growth rate of six per cent annually.

The National Development Plan has highlighted some weaknesses facing the cabinet cluster system. One of the weaknesses is that cluster meetings tend to be consumed by departmental submissions and thus become a clearing house instead of focussing on strategic issues and prioritisation. The National Development Plan proposes that some of the coordination problems facing the complex nature of governance can be resolved through engagement between branches, chief directorates and directorates of departments as opposed to the current escalation of administrative and interdepartmental matters to clusters. The Presidency should assume a mediating role by bringing parties together with a view to finding a solution to issues related to role conflict and interdepartmental relations (National Development Plan 2011:70).

REORGANISATION OF THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE

The Constitution, 1996 is silent on the limit of the number of ministers and deputy ministers that should be appointed by the President. In 2009, President Zuma appointed 34 ministers responsible for various portfolios. Whilst, Mbeki’s Cabinet was composed of 26 ministers. Following the second term of office of President Zuma which commenced after the 2014 general election he announced the reconfiguration of his Cabinet on 24 May 2014 by introducing new ministries namely, the Small Business Development; Water and Sanitation; Environmental Affairs; Telecommunications and Postal Services; and Communications ministries and combined a few existing ministries namely, the Justice and Correctional Services; Planning and Performance Monitoring and Evaluation bringing the number of his Cabinet members to 35. By and large, the South African Cabinet is comparatively bloated in relation to Brazil, Russia, India and China all being South Africa’s trading partners operating under the umbrella of BRICS, these countries have large population sizes (e.g. India has a population of over one billion and yet the new Prime Minister Mr Modi has trimmed his Cabinet from 76 to 46 in 2014, while Russia has over 146 million population and a Cabinet of 25 and Brazil has a population of over 200 million and a Cabinet of 24 ministries). These countries are characterised by strong economic bases compared to South Africa. A strong public opinion has emerged as expressed by various political observers, media houses, political parties and ordinary citizens regarding the cost effectiveness of President Zuma’s Cabinet based on the economic constraints facing South Africa.

The flipside of this argument could also be advanced on the basis of the fact that South Africa is still a developing country and the twenty years of democratic dispensation necessitated that major policy reforms and shifts in many fronts were needed, (i.e. the economy, trade and
investment, public service, education, health) and thus burdened the administrative arm of the government with policy implementation capacity and resourcefulness. A case in point is the National Development Plan that pertinently diagnosed the enormity of the challenges and problems facing South Africa in the economic, social, and education domains and more importantly it highlights the capacity deficits evident in the three spheres of government and other state owned enterprises. Thus the notion of building a capable and developmental state is clearly articulated in Chapter 13 of the National Development Plan.

In the case of the Canadian situation, the Cabinet sizes have varied under different Prime Ministers, for example, in 1987 Prime Minister Brian Mulroney appointed 40 Cabinet members, in 1996 under Prime Minister Jean Chrétien the number was reduced to 25. However, in 2013 Prime Minister Stephen Harper established a Cabinet of 39 members (The Canadian Encyclopaedia 2014).

When President Zuma announced his new Cabinet on 25 May 2014 he articulated the primacy accorded to the implementation of the National Development Plan (Vision 2030)– which places job creation, economic growth and social development as the major priorities of his new national executive. As a result, he established the Small Business development ministry as part of fast tracking the creation of new enterprises aimed at improving the economy and generating the much needed new employment opportunities to achieve the target of 11 million new jobs by 2030. It also had to address the red tape that impedes potential entrepreneurs from setting up new ventures and expanding existing businesses. The establishment of this new ministry was also informed by the lobbying and pressure exerted by the business community over the past few years without the desired success. The efficacy of this new ministry will undoubtedly be assessed during the second term of office of President Zuma.

Intriguingly, the Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs ministry has had four ministers in a period of five years since the beginning of the first term of President Zuma in 2009 to 2014. The endemic governance problems, gross mismanagement, and spontaneous public service delivery protests facing municipalities clearly require stable, bold, decisive and interventionist political leadership of this ministry. The appointment of Pravin Gordhan (former Minister of Finance) to head the ministry of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs could signal the intentions of the President to unravel the perennial governance challenges facing municipalities and ensure that sound governance and administrative systems are put in place to steer municipalities towards viability, efficiency and effectiveness.

INSTITUTIONAL BLOCKAGES

The following impediments could be identified as examples of the institutional challenges facing the South African government:

Inadequate capacity related to strategic visioning, planning and integration at the top level of management

One of the biggest challenges to the effective performance of the public service resides in the fact that politicians and public servants lack basic competences related to strategic thinking and
planning, leadership and management, policy competency, to name but a few. As a result, it is difficult for the public service to be consistent in meeting the aspirations of the government.

Ineffective political and executive leadership

Public trust in the state is growing, because there is now mounting recognition that the market cannot replace the state, even in service delivery; indeed it can only complement and buttress state action. At the same time, there remains a deep skepticism regarding the capacity of the state to deliver on national, regional and global programmes. There are also concerns regarding the integrity of top ranking politicians and state bureaucracies (Pagaza and Argyriades 2009:48). Nevertheless, the main cause of ineffectiveness in the public sector is basically the lack of consensus on the building blocks of a collective political culture and the issues concerning the integrity of politicians and public servants in achieving government imperatives. Maintaining a successful level of satisfaction in the performance of the public service requires meaningful cooperation between politicians and public servants.

Ineffective intergovernmental and interdepartmental coordination

A responsive Public Service depends on the capacity of all three spheres of government to coordinate their actions, integrate planning processes and ensure effective communication with a view to deliver services in the most prompt, effective and efficient manner. Sound and effective intergovernmental and interdepartmental coordination mechanisms and structures remains a sine-qua non for the capacitation of the South African developmental state.

Ineffective staff recruitment

Recruiting the right people for the right jobs remains problematic in the context of South Africa. As long as recruitment in the public service is concerned with reducing the level of unemployment, it will be difficult to have public servants who can diligently perform their tasks. To address this issue, it is essential that standards are established in order to attract suitable candidates to public administration. This can be done by scrutinizing the profiles of new recruits while older employees are trained to have a passion for serving the public. The National Executive Committee’s lekgotla of the governing party, recently pronounced that unqualified municipal officials must be removed from their posts. It is furthermore required that skills audits should be conducted throughout the three spheres of government (ANC National Executive Committee’s Lekgotla Statement 23 January 2015). This indicates that government intends to ensure that the public sector is professionalised through the filling of posts by competent and qualified individuals.

STRATEGIES REQUIRED FOR REFORMS TO BE SUCCESSFUL

Wescott (2007:494) identifies five strategies that are generally met when public administration reforms start to take hold: leadership; vision; selectivity; sensitivity; and stamina. These issues are explained in more detail in the following exposition.
Leadership

Barzelay (2003) points out that heads of state and top officials have a crucial role in putting reforms on the policy agenda and in determining how important reforms are relative to other priorities, with the decisive factors being maximizing political advantage and minimizing political risk. For many leaders, the politically opportune time for launching reforms is shortly after forming a government.

In Vanuatu, inheriting fiscal uncertainties and a weak governance structure, the government that assumed office in October 1996 introduced the Comprehensive Reform Programme that covered the reform of the public service, public enterprises, improving the enabling environment for private sector development and the introduction of a participative and consultative governance culture (Wescott 2007:494).

Vision

Comprehensive reforms that take hold are founded on a coherent vision of goals, broad objectives, and notional timetables for bringing about improved public administration. For example, Vietnam’s PAR Programme approved by the Prime Minister in 2002 outlines a workplan for the period 2001–2010. It proposes to reform the entire public administrative system by the end of that period. The Programme’s agenda further includes replacing cumbersome administrative procedures with more simplified and transparent ones; reducing corruption; defining the mandates and functions of institutions; reforming provincial and other subnational administrations and streamlining and rightsizing the organisational structures of ministries and other agencies (Wescott 2007:496).

Selectivity

Reforms take hold when they are important, and have a good potential to be implemented in a timely manner and to be a catalyst for additional reforms. Selectivity means filling in the reform timetable in a pragmatic manner, while supporting the long-term vision. It does not mean pushing ahead with ad hoc reforms or with isolated project implementation units (Wescott 2007:496).

Sensitivity

According to Wescott (2007:497) each country has its own unique historical, political and cultural context that needs to be factored in. For example, Cambodia has experienced frequent changes in its political and economic regimes that have invariably shaped its economic and legal models from market-based, to Soviet-style central planning and now back to a market based economy. The Royal Government of Cambodia has set up a Governance Action Plan that intends to address post-conflict issues including reconciliation, rebuilding institutions and skills development.

Stamina

Any fundamental reform takes time to take hold, and needs to be sustained across changes in governments. The range of administrative problems and the economic and political urgency
of solving them, is invariably crucial for governments to develop a comprehensive vision and time-table for reform. However, because of the enormity and political sensitivity of the task, and the glaring limitations on capacity to manage reform, such a framework may take several years to yield results and impact.

CONCLUSION

This article examined the repositioning of South Africa’s public administration in the context of the Zuma presidency. The formation of new ministries is informed by the new administration’s efforts to ensure proper alignment and co-ordination of government’s service delivery programmes and policy implementation throughout the three spheres of government. However, the repositioning of public administration does not automatically translate into immediate results as noted in the article. Some institutional impediments remain inherent in the Public Service and it is incumbent upon the Zuma administration to demonstrate effective leadership and management to resolve them.

A results oriented Public Service would certainly ensure that public service delivery initiatives and efforts reach the broader society and improves their standard of living. At the same time, government, through performance monitoring and evaluation, will be able to develop the necessary corrective action measures to deal with gaps and blockages and include this into the planning cycle and decision making processes at the macro and micro levels.

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